Central bank intervention is the practice of monetary authorities buying and selling currency in the foreign exchange market to influence exchange rates. Although some major central banks have intervened less frequently recently, all central banks retain it as a tool in their arsenals and some still commonly employ it.
Intervention researchers seek to answer several questions: What effect does intervention have on the level and volatility of exchange rates? To what conditions do central banks respond?
Secondarily, how do factors such as coordination, direction, secrecy and amount of intervention affect the answers to those questions? Understanding the dynamic impact of intervention on exchange rates is a first step toward understanding its potential impact on inflation and output through changes in exchange rates and expectations. And describing the impact of intervention could inform our understanding of exchange rate microstructure.
The literature on intervention has primarily addressed these questions with event studies-examinations of exchange rate behavior around intervention. Recently, these event studies have begun to use higher-frequency data, combined with some knowledge of the timing of intervention. High-frequency studies are handicapped, however, by the lack of accurately timed intervention data. 1 More importantly, while event studies find important correlations, they do not uncover structural relations without additional, often implausible, assumptions about the structure of the economy. That is, event studies describe how exchange rates behave around periods of intervention, rather than how intervention influences exchange rates. 1 Only the Swiss National Bank publicly provides intervention times. The Bank of Canada has provided intervention times confidentially to certain researchers. Intervention times for other central banks must be inferred from press reports; Fischer (2007) shows that Reuters's report times were fairly inaccurate for Swiss National Bank intervention.
In practice, because central banks often seek to counter recent exchange rate trends, a simple regression of exchange rate returns on intervention will typically imply a perverse (or zero) impact of intervention on exchange rates. This tells one nothing about the actual impact of intervention, however, because the regression coefficient does not consistently estimate any structural parameter.
To properly sort out the dynamic cross-impacts of intervention and exchange rates, one must explicitly confront the important issue of identification-assumptions necessary to obtain consistent estimates of structural parameters.
2 Identification problems are ubiquitous in econometrics and especially important for those who advise policy makers. Economic policy reacts to economic conditions, which depend on economic policy.
This paper proposes and estimates an explicit, identified, dynamic structure for U.S.
intervention and uses it to illustrate the dependence of inference on identification assumptions.
Three elements underlie the construction of this system: 1) Modest knowledge of the likely timing of U.S. intervention; 2) macro announcement surprise data to be used as instruments for exchange rates; and 3) a nonlinear structure to identify and construct impulse responses.
The systems constructed with these elements imply that intervention has the desired effect on the level of exchange rates: USD purchases raise the value of the USD. And overnight exchange rate returns predict intervention in the expected way: U.S. authorities "leaned against the wind" with respect to overnight (and prior) returns. There is evidence, however, that U.S.
authorities leaned with the wind during the business day of intervention.
To illustrate how important identification assumptions are to inference, this paper compares the nonlinear identified results with those of two other models: an identified linear model and a nonlinear model with an unjustifiably restricted covariance matrix. While the data reject these models, they serve as useful benchmarks to judge the importance of identification assumptions.
The next section briefly discusses the literature on central bank intervention. The third section describes the data while the fourth confronts the issues of stability and identification to infer the cross-effects of U.S. intervention and exchange rates in a linear system. Then nonlinear systems are introduced and estimated. The final section concludes.
Studies of the Effects of Intervention
Event studies, which are the most common way to study the effects of intervention, can be informal examinations of price behavior or formal analyses that incorporate statistical tests.
Event Studies With Daily Data
Many papers describe themselves as event studies: Fatum (2002) , Fatum and Hutchinson (2002 , 2003a , 2003b , Edison, Cashin and Liang (2003) . Fatum and Hutchinson (2003b) Other papers can reasonably be described as event studies-even though they do not use that term-because they characterize the behavior of exchange rates around periods of 2 Parameters that are derived from microeconomic models are often termed "deep" structural parameters. This paper intervention, without explicitly identifying structural relations: Humpage (1999 Humpage ( , 2000 , Aguilar and Nydalh (2000) , Kim, Kortian and Sheen (2000) , Ito (2002) , Chaboud and Humpage (2003) , Rogers and Siklos (2003) . Typically, these papers statistically test if exchange rates-or some function of exchange rates-behave unusually on or after days of intervention.
Intraday Event Studies
More recently, a third group of papers have used intraday data to evaluate the behavior of exchange rates at very high frequencies around the times of intervention. Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) , Payne and Vitale (2003) and Pasquariello (2002) have exploited Swiss National Bank (SNB) data on the exact times of its intervention, not just the day and amount. Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) look at irregular observations at times of intervention to examine the effects of intervention. Payne and Vitale (2003) use 15-minute exchange rate data to quantify the effects of intervention operations on the USD/CHF rate. Pasquariello (2002) looks at a wider variety of exchange rate behavior-including spreads-in a similar exercise. Beattie and Fillion (1999) use confidential timed intervention data from the Bank of Canada to similarly investigate the effects of Canadian intervention. Fatum and King (2005) compare the effects of rule-based and discretionary Canadian intervention on high-frequency data. They find that intervention does systematically affect the CAD/USD and might be associated with reduced volatility. Finally, Dominguez (2003a Dominguez ( , 2003b regresses 5-minute exchange rate returns and volatility on leads and lags of news announcement and intervention news dummies, taken from newswire reports, during days of U.S. intervention from 1987 to 1993. Dominguez interprets the coefficients on intervention and news as the impact of those events on exchange rate behavior. Fischer (2007) uses the more traditional meaning of structural: The equations/parameters have economic interpretations.
implicitly criticizes the reliance on such newswire reports by showing that they were fairly inaccurate for SNB intervention, whose times are publicly known.
While intraday studies of intervention have been tremendously valuable in understanding the impact of intervention, at least two problems remain. First, while intraday studies only look at short event windows, intervention might have its full effects over days or weeks. 3 Therefore such studies do not really answer the question of interest: What is the dynamic response of exchange rates to intervention? Second, the paucity of exact intervention timing prevents such studies' conclusions from being cross-checked in other samples. Inference could be fragile.
Identified Studies of Intervention
The principal weakness of event studies is that while they characterize the behavior of exchange rates around intervention, they do not uncover the causal structure of the economy. To determine the effect of intervention on exchange rates, one must consider how the economic system simultaneously determines exchange rates and intervention. Even single-equation methods, e.g., two-stage least squares, must implicitly assume a structure for the system. Kim (2003) and Kearns and Rigobon (2005) explicitly model structural economic relations to identify the effect of intervention on exchange rates. Kim (2003) used monthly data from 1974:1-1996:12 in a structural VAR to examine the effects of intervention and monetary policy on a trade-weighted exchange rate. Neely (2005a and 2005b) , however, shows that the intervention effects in Kim's (2003) structural VAR model are not identified. They might, however, be interpreted as one set of responses that is consistent with the data. Additionally, the intervention variable-purchases of USD-in Kim (2003) is misidentified as purchases of foreign exchange. Therefore Kim's model actually implies an implausible perverse impact of intervention. In a novel study, Kearns and Rigobon (2005) exploit structural breaks in the Japanese and Australian authorities' reaction functions to estimate a model of intervention.
Structural Stability
The use of structural breaks in Kearns and Rigobon (2005) ironically underscores another problem with intervention studies: structural instability. Structural stability is particularly problematic for intervention studies because the coefficients of reduced-form relations will generally change with the intervention reaction function. This paper will attempt to confront the issue of structural stability by looking for a period in which the reduced-form parameters are relatively stable.
The Data
This analysis uses two U.S. intervention series: U.S. in-market purchases of millions of Olsen and Associates provided 5-minute returns on the DEM, JPY, CHF, and GBP spot exchange rates against the USD from 1987 through 1998. The data were filtered to remove obvious errors. Haver Analytics provided various macroeconomic announcements, as well as survey expectations of those announcements. The surprises constructed from macro announcement data will be used as instruments for exchange rate returns.
Because-as will be shown-almost all U.S. intervention occurs during the business day, the intraday exchange rate data are valuable for identifying structural relations by separately constructing business-day and overnight exchange rate returns. period, however. Therefore the examination of the cross-effects of intervention and exchange rates will be undertaken in the 1987-1990 period.
The exchange rate panels of Figure 1 also display the purchasing power parity (PPP)-implied fundamental values-interpolated from monthly to daily frequency-for the exchange rate. Casual observation suggests that the U.S. authorities tend to buy the dollar when it is "overvalued" by the PPP measure and sell it under opposite circumstances. Statistical tests, such as those in Neely (2002) , formally confirm this impression. 4 That is, intervention tends to be positive (negative) when the exchange rate is below (above) its fundamental value. Deviations from the daily PPP-fundamental help to explain intervention. Such deviations will be included as explanatory variables for intervention and exchange rates. 
The Effects of Central Bank Intervention: A Linear Framework
The econometric problems associated with determining the effects of central bank intervention-stability, omitted variables, the unusual distribution of intervention, and identification-must be solved to infer the cross-effects of intervention and exchange rates. This paper will initially estimate dynamic impacts with a benchmark, linear near-VAR Stadtmann (2003) studied the inclination of Japanese authorities to intervene to "target" exchange rates. Taylor (2003) uses the degree of misalignment within a Markov switching model of intervention.
representation-which ignores the unusual distribution of intervention-before comparing and contrasting these linear results with those of the preferred nonlinear frameworks.
Identifying Assumptions from Macro Announcements and the Timing of Intervention
Both exchange rate returns and volatility influence the size and probability of intervention within a day, but intervention simultaneously influences exchange rate behavior. To estimate the structural effect of intervention on exchange rates, or vice versa, one must assume a structure for the system governing exchange rates and intervention. An instrument for either variable, coupled with the assumption that the structural shocks are orthogonal, would be sufficient to identify the cross-effects of intervention and exchange rates in a linear system. A good instrument should be highly predictive of the regressor for which it serves as an instrument, but not structurally predictive of the dependent variable.
It is often difficult to find good instruments. The surprise components of macroeconomic announcements-the first report of the macro variable, less its median survey expectations-may be good instruments for exchange rates, however. Such announcements-typically made at 7:30 or 8:30 a.m., New York time-strongly predict exchange rates (Faust et al. (2003) ), but presumably do not directly influence intervention. 5 While macroeconomic surprises represent revisions to estimated fundamentals that could conceivably generate intervention, bias in the coefficients would require the intervention authorities to observe, (strongly) reassess fundamentals and react directly to the announcement within hours. This seems very unlikely. Galati, Melick and Micu (2002) used macro announcement data as regressors to control for the effect of shocks in their study of intervention's effect on option-implied moments. Announcements could indirectly influence intervention through exchange market effects and still be valid instruments. 6 Private conversations with central bankers involved in reserve management/intervention have confirmed that intervention is very unlikely to respond directly to announcements. While using macro announcements to identify the cross-effects of intervention and exchange rates seems very plausible, all identification assumptions-like models themselves-are necessarily approximations and subject to criticism. For example, Faust and Leeper (1997) Indeed, the extensive intervention reaction function literature ignores the idea that macro announcements themselves predict intervention, though announcements have been used in exchange rate equations.
One can estimate the system more precisely by exploiting the fact that both the policy action (intervention) and the potential instrument (macro announcements) occur during the business day. 7 Breaking up the exchange rate return into overnight (r pm,t ) and business-day returns (r am,t )
isolates the business day return that is simultaneous with intervention and macro announcements.
This increases the predictive power of the instrument and isolates the effect of intervention on exchange rates.
How does one know that U.S. intervention typically occurs during the business day?
Although the U.S. authorities do not publicly release the times of intervention, one can estimate them from the timing of intervention news. Olsen and Associates conveniently provides
Reuters's headline news data on days of G-3 intervention, from August 18, 1989, through August 15, 1995. Figure 2 shows the hours of reported U.S. intervention for this sample in the DEM (top panel) and JPY (lower panel). The great majority of U.S. intervention reports for the DEM and JPY markets were between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., New York time. This is consistent with Goodhart and Hesse (1993) and Humpage (1999) , who report that U.S. intervention generally occurs before the London markets close at 11 a.m., New York time.
8 characterize the shortcomings of long-run identification restrictions, as used in Blanchard and Quah (1989) . Faust, Swanson and Wright (2004) disapprove of the often-used Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) monetary VAR assumptions. Neely, Roy and Whiteman (2001) criticized Hansen and Singleton's (1983) CCAPM identification scheme for using weak instruments. Indeed, Sims (1980) even objects to the textbook example of using weather to identify shifts in agricultural supply curves. 7 Humpage (1999 Humpage ( , 2000 used similar timing of morning and end-of-business exchange rates in some of his studies. 8 The figure is similar to one in Dominguez (2003a) . Slight differences between the figures are probably due to different interpretations of news headlines. The inaccuracy of Reuters's reports cited by Fischer (2007) is not nearly large enough to refute the conclusion from Figure 2 , that the vast majority of U.S. intervention occurs during New York business hours.
The long literature on choosing instrument sets ultimately recommends a parsimonious instrument set that strongly predicts the regressor. For good distributional results, Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) provide a function that specifies desired F-statistics as a function of the number of instruments. For one instrument, they recommend an F-statistic of 10. Therefore the optimal instrument set was chosen to maximize the F statistic for the linear regression of the businessday exchange rate return on every possible instrument set from the 6 announcement surprises with the highest univariate t statistics. The shock to the U.S. trade balance is the best instrument for both exchange rates; it very strongly predicts both DEM and JPY business day returns, having extremely high F statistics of 59.2 and 49.9, respectively.
The Structure of the Linear System
It seems desirable, in providing a benchmark against which to assess the importance of the nonlinear results to be presented later, to estimate a linear model with a similar identification scheme. The structural form of the linear model with one lag (for simplicity) is as follows:
(1) , where r pm,t and r am,t are the log exchange rate changes from 4 p.m. on t-1 to 7 a.m. on t and from 7 a.m. on t to 4 p.m. on t; I t is the amount of USD purchased by U.S. authorities on day t; ma t is the macroeconomic announcement shock (actual less expected) on day t; ppp t is the deviation from purchasing-power parity; and
. 9 The contemporaneous interaction matrix permits 1) r pm,t to influence intervention (δ pm ); 2) r am,t to influence intervention (δ am ); 3) correlation between r pm,t and r am,t (ρ); and 4) intervention can influence r am,t (β).
9 The regressor set is basically consistent with the practice in the literature. See the classic survey by Edison (1993 The Bayesian information criterion (Schwarz (1978) ) chooses a lag length of three lags for both exchange rates, from a maximum of 20 lags, for the reduced-form representation of (1). Figure 3 shows the effect of a one-standard-deviation U.S. purchase of USD in the linear model of DEM/USD and JPY/USD levels, along with a bootstrapped 80 percent confidence interval. The impacts at each horizon are measured as the cumulative sums of the impacts to the a.m. and p.m. returns. Intervention has no significant impact on the DEM exchange rate; the point estimate is essentially zero. In contrast, the estimated effect on the JPY/USD is positive and significant, initially about 11 basis points, rising to 14 basis points over the impulse horizon.
What Effect Does Intervention Have on Returns in the Linear Model?
The identified linear model finds a positive effect of intervention on the JPY/USD exchange rate despite the negative contemporaneous correlations between the variables (Table 2) .
There is no evidence that the dynamic effect of intervention is greater than the static impact. Many central bankers who actually conduct intervention, however, believe that the dynamic impact is greater than the static impact (Neely (2000)). All of the responding intervention practitioners believe that intervention is effective in influencing exchange rates and nearly 40 percent of them believe that its maximal effect takes at least a few days. The evidence in Figure 3 lacks the power to either refute or confirm this hypothesis.
What Effects Do Returns Have on Intervention in the Linear Model?
A ubiquitous finding in the intervention literature is that central banks "lean against the wind." That is, central banks tend to buy (sell) the domestic currency if it has recently depreciated (appreciated). This stylized fact is consistent with the dynamic impact of a shock to returns on intervention, shown in Figure 4 . Business day (r am,t ) and overnight (r pm,t ) return shocks have a significant, negative impact on intervention for both exchange rates. U.S.
intervention in the JPY market seems to react more strongly to overnight returns than to business day returns. The impacts of overnight and business day returns are more similar to each other in the DEM market.
diagonal covariance matrix (D) identifies the rest of the contemporaneous interaction matrix (δ pm , ρ and β) from the estimated reduced form covariance matrix.
Central Bank Intervention and Exchange Rate Returns: A Friction-Model Framework

The Friction Model System
The results from the linear representation are not entirely satisfactory because central bank intervention has an unusual distribution, being frequently equal to zero (see Figure 1) . It is well known that linear models produce inconsistent estimates of the parameters of limited-dependent processes. To investigate whether the linear representation is adequate or misleading, one can construct a nonlinear model of the interaction between exchange rates and intervention that follows the spirit and basic assumptions of the benchmark linear representation.
The heart of the nonlinear system is a friction model that permits the dependent variableintervention-to be insensitive to its determinants over a range of values (Rosett (1959) 
where X t is a vector of all explanatory variables-lags of endogenous variables, the macro announcement instrument and deviations from purchasing power parity-excluding the constant.
12 To maintain notational simplicity, X t includes the macro announcement but the corresponding element of A 1 equals zero. without that seemingly innocuous assumption will illustrate the sensitivity of the inference to identification assumptions. 13 Note that observed intervention appears on the right-hand side of the equation, not the value of shadow intervention, as in Nelson and Olson (1978) . Sickles and Schmidt (1978) discuss the differences in interpretation and estimation between the two types of models. 14 This identification scheme is grossly similar to that of Kearns and Rigobon (2005) in the following way: That paper assumed a structural break in the intervention threshold, giving two sets of reduced-form moments-one set from the first subsample, one set from the second-and only one more parameter. Similarly, in the present
The likelihood function for the system is as follows: 
where f Ω00 is the normal likelihood with variance term ω 00 and f Ω12 is the bivariate normal likelihood with covariance matrix Ω 12 , the intersection of the 2 nd and 3 rd rows and columns of Ω.
The system was estimated by maximum likelihood, subject to the constraints that βδ < 1 and that the dynamic behavior be stable. Appendix A describes how an iterative process generated consistent starting values. The delta method produced confidence intervals for the impulse responses; bootstrapping and/or Monte Carlo simulation would be computationally burdensome.
Intervention's Effect in the Friction Model
The left-hand side of Figure 5 shows the dynamic impact of a 3-standard-deviation shock to intervention on the foreign exchange levels and returns without restricting ω 12 .
15 The estimated impact is positive for both the DEM and the JPY but the confidence interval for the DEM is large enough to barely include zero. One should be careful about interpreting the deltamethod confidence intervals, however. Correlation between the parameter estimates causes the Hessian to substantially overstate the true uncertainty about δ, β and ω 12 . Section 5.5 explores the reasons for this in greater detail. Contrary to the marginal significance implied by the confidence interventions in Figure 5 , likelihood ratio tests clearly show that the initial impact of nonlinear study, the way the structural parameters map into reduced-form moments depends on whether intervention is zero or not. This provides different sets of reduced-form moments. 15 The figures use a 3-standard-deviation shock in the friction-normal models because smaller shocks would often fail to meet the intervention threshold and would therefore have no impact. Because the nonlinear model implies different effects of different-sized shocks, one cannot directly compare the linear and nonlinear results for some intervention (β) is statistically significant, with p-values of 0.012 for the DEM and 0.002 for the JPY. The estimated DEM point impact tends to fall slightly over time while that of the JPY tends to rise slightly.
The point estimates of the impact of intervention (β) imply that a $100 million USD purchase causes a 5 to 6 basis point USD appreciation in either the DEM/USD or JPY/USD markets. Point estimates of β from the two markets were very similar. It is difficult to cleanly compare the present results with those of the previous literature because the present model is dynamic and nonlinear, incorporating threshold effects. In addition, intervention's impact surely varies over time and with the nature of the exchange rate market. Nevertheless, the present point estimates are broadly consistent with those from two well-known intervention studies. Dominguez (2003) , who studied G-3 intervention at an intraday frequency, found that a $100 million U.S. intervention in the DEM market had a maximal impact of almost 3 basis points.
Using daily data, Kearns and Rigobon (2005) found that a $100 million Bank of Japan intervention had a 20-basis-point impact in the JPY/USD market, while the same-sized Reserve Bank of Australia intervention had a 1.3 to 1.8 percent impact in the smaller AUD/USD market.
16
To illustrate the sensitivity of the present results to seemingly innocuous identification assumptions, the right-hand side of Figure 5 shows the same dynamic impacts under the restriction that ω 12 equals zero. This seemingly minor change makes a very substantial impact on the impulse responses. The estimated initial impact of intervention is now significantly standard-sized shock. The responses are computed to single shocks, although the structural shocks may be correlated. 16 The small size of estimated effects of intervention might cause one to wonder about whether intervention is important. Reitz and Taylor (2006) implicitly answer this question by laying out a nonlinear intervention model in which intervention serves to coordinate the expectations of rational speculators.
negative (perverse) and is never significantly positive for either exchange rate, using the standard delta-method confidence bounds.
To summarize, inference about the effectiveness of intervention depends on the treatment of ω 12 . When ω 12 is freely estimated, β is larger and positive, implying that intervention has the desired impact on exchange rates in the friction model. When ω 12 is restricted to equal zero, the estimated impact of intervention is negative (perverse). The data, however, strongly reject the restriction that ω 12 equals zero and therefore we conclude that the model that provides economically sensible results (with ω 12 free) is also statistically appropriate.
Why do the results change when ω 12 is restricted? The restriction changes the estimated responses because the estimate of ω 12 is correlated with the estimated initial impact of intervention on returns (β) and the estimated initial impact of returns on intervention (δ am ). But these parameters play conceptually different roles in the assumed nonlinear data-generating process. Restricting ω 12 forces the covariance between structural shocks to influence estimates of β and δ am . But likelihood ratio tests clearly reject the null that ω 12 equals 0. In other words, the restricted model is misspecified; one should expect incorrect answers. These results, in which ω 12 equals zero, illustrate the sensitivity of inference to false identification restrictions. Figure 6 illustrates the friction-model-implied dynamic impact of a 3-standard-deviation shock to overnight and business-day returns on intervention in the DEM/USD (top two panels) and JPY/USD markets (bottom two panels). Again, the left-hand panels do not restrict ω 12 while the right-hand panels restrict it to be zero. The restriction on ω 12 makes little difference for the estimated impact of overnight returns on intervention. Intervention in both exchange rates show a (negative) leaning-against-the-wind reaction to overnight returns. The restriction on ω 12 does change the estimated impact of business-day returns, however. When ω 12 is restricted to equal zero in the right-hand panels, the model implies a leaning-against-the wind reaction to DEM returns (second panel on the right) and the shock to JPY returns is insufficient to overcome the intervention threshold (fourth panel on the right).
The Intervention Reaction Function in the Friction Model
The leaning-with-the-wind reaction implied by leaving ω 12 unrestricted is very plausible, especially at very high frequencies. Although central banks usually lean against recent trends in exchange rates, private communications with central bankers suggest that they often lean with the wind at very high (intraday) frequencies. In addition, most central bankers who responded to Neely's (2006) survey agree that skillful choices of trading opportunities within a day are important for an authority's success in intervention.
The Linear model vs. the friction model
Comparing the linear cases, Figure 3 and Figure 4 , to the friction-model system, Figure 5 and Figure 6 , the unrestricted nonlinear case (ω 12 free) implies a more consistently positive impact of intervention on exchange rates than does the linear case, while the restricted case (ω 12 = 0) implies an implausible, perverse effect. The linear model clearly implies a leaning-againstthe-wind intervention reaction, which the nonlinear model confirms for overnight returns. The treatment of ω 12 governs intervention's reaction to business-day returns in the nonlinear models:
Permitting ω 12 to be free identifies a tendency to lean with the wind at intraday frequencies. The correlation between the parameter estimates leaves the Hessian nearly singular; its inverse imprecisely estimates and exaggerates the true sampling uncertainty. Therefore the 17 The restriction of ω 12 probably strongly influences the estimate of β indirectly, through other parameters. 18 An additional problem is the methods used to calculate numerical Hessians might not be very trustworthy in large nonlinear models with parameters of varying magnitudes. There is not much to be done about that, although rescaling the parameters might be of some help.
Identification in the friction model
delta-method confidence intervals are oversized; they show that intervention's effects are marginally significant, while the likelihood ratio tests strongly reject the null that intervention has no effect.
Conclusion
Recently, two research methods have furthered our understanding of the effects of intervention. The first strand uses high-frequency data and information on the timing of intervention to conduct event studies of the behavior of exchange rates around intervention, e.g., Beattie and Fillion (1999) , Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) , Payne and Vitale (2003 ), Dominguez (2003a , 2003b , Pasquariello (2002) , Fatum and King (2005) . Such research has very usefully characterized the correlations in the data, but has been mostly silent on the structure of the economic system, making it very difficult to identify causality. The second strand takes the identification issue seriously and uses lower-frequency data to identify the effect of intervention on exchange rates, as in Kim (2003) and Kearns and Rigobon (2005) .
This paper combines the advantages of these strands of the literature in proposing and estimating a new identification scheme, based on the usual timing of intervention, using macro announcement surprises as instruments for exchange rate changes in a nonlinear system. The scheme identifies the dynamic cross-effects of intervention and foreign exchange rates.
Using data from the period 1987 through 1990-where the data show relatively little evidence against stability-the linear model finds that U.S. intervention in the JPY market has a significant effect in the desired direction but the estimated effect of intervention in the DEM market is essentially zero. The linear model picks up clear leaning-against-the-wind effects-U.S. authorities buy (sell) USD when it has been depreciating (appreciating). The linear model is used only as a benchmark, however, to illustrate the importance of nonlinearity and identification assumptions.
Inference in the preferred nonlinear model generally differs from that of the linear system and depends on the treatment of the covariance of structural shocks. When the covariance (ω 12 )
is restricted to equal zero-which statistical tests strongly reject-the nonlinear system implies that intervention has a perverse effect on exchange rates but the business-day leaning-againstthe-wind reaction returns. In other words, imposing a seemingly innocuous identification assumption, that the structural shocks may be correlated, implausibly implies that intervention has a significant perverse impact.
When the covariance between contemporaneous exchange rate and intervention shocks (ω 12 )
is freely estimated, the nonlinear system implies that intervention moves exchange rates significantly in the desired direction and intervention leans with-the-wind at intra-business-day frequency. That is, all the nonlinear results with "ω 12 free" model are reasonable, consistent with our knowledge of intervention policy and definitely statistically significant. The conclusions of this "ω 12 free" model are economically sensible and statistically preferred to any other model studied here. This sensitivity illustrates the importance of attention to identification issues.
It would be desirable to extend the model in the present paper to investigate secondary it is not easy to answer such questions; the dynamic nonlinear models are difficult to estimate.
But such research is underway.
Appendix A: Identification and estimation of a friction-model system
This appendix explains how the parameters of the friction-model system are identified and initially estimated from the reduced-form moments. 
A.1 Estimating the Model
We can estimate the reduced form for I t , using all observations (sets T1, T2 and T3). The likelihood function is given by the following: 
One can decompose the error in (A.19) through (A.21) into estimable functions and an uncorrelated mean-zero error: 
A.2 Identifying the Structural Parameters
The following summarizes the relation between the structural parameters and the reduced-form parameters: (6) Solve for Ω using previously estimated parameters-, and W -in ˆa δˆβˆˆ(A.32).
These iterative estimates are then used as starting values in maximum likelihood estimation. purchases of billions of USD-business day returns (r am ), and evening returns (r pm ). 
